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‘We’re an Empire Now’:
The United States Between Imperial
Denial and Premature Decolonization
Niall Ferguson
We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while
you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will
sort out. We’re history’s actors…and you, all of you, will be left to just study
what we do.
A “senior adviser” to President Bush, as quoted by Ron Suskind1
‘History,’ [Bush] said, shrugging, taking his hands out of his pockets, extending his arms and suggesting with his body language that it was so far off. ‘We
won’t know. We’ll all be dead.’
Bob Woodward, quoting President Bush2

I

s the United States an empire? It is, I have discovered, acceptable
to say that it is—provided that you deplore the fact. At the same time,
it is permitted to say that American power is potentially beneficent—
provided that you do not describe it as imperial. What is not allowed
is to say that the United States is an empire and that this might not
be wholly bad. My book Colossus set out to do this, and thereby succeeded in antagonizing both conservative and liberal critics. Conservatives repudiated my contention that the United States is and, indeed,
has always been an empire. They prefer to think of it as a hegemon, a
superpower, a world leader—anything but an empire. Liberals were
dismayed by my suggestion that the American empire might have
positive as well as negative attributes. For them, American imperialism
can have no redeeming features. It has been and must remain one of
history’s Bad Things.
As in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe, so in the United States today, it
seems to be expected, “That every boy and every gal / That’s born into
the world alive / Is either a little Liberal, / Or else a little Conservative!”
But I am afraid my book is neither. Here, in a simplified form, is what
it says:
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1. The United States has always been, functionally if not self-consciously, an empire;
2. a self-conscious American imperialism might well be preferable to
the available alternatives, but
3. financial, human, and cultural constraints make such self-consciousness highly unlikely, and
4. therefore the American empire, insofar as it continues to exist, will
remain a somewhat dysfunctional entity.
The case for an American empire in Colossus is therefore twofold.
First, there is the case for its functional existence; second, the case for
the potential advantages of a self-conscious American imperialism. By
self-conscious imperialism, please note, I do not mean that the United
States should unabashedly proclaim itself an empire and its president
an emperor. Perish the thought. I merely mean that Americans need to
recognize the imperial characteristics of their own power today and, if
possible, to learn from the achievements and failures of past empires.
It is no longer possible to maintain the fiction that there is something
wholly unique about the foreign relations of the United States. The
dilemmas America faces today have more in common with those faced
by the later Caesars than with those faced by the Founding Fathers.3
At the same time, however, the book makes clear the grave perils
of being an “empire in denial.” Americans are not wholly oblivious
to the imperial role their country plays in the world. But they dislike
it. “I think we’re trying to run the business of the world too much,”
a Kansas farmer told the British author Timothy Garton Ash in 2003,
“…like the Romans used to.”4 To such feelings of unease, American
politicians respond with a categorical reassurance. “We’re not an imperial power,” declared President George W. Bush last April, “We’re a
liberating power.”5
Of all the misconceptions that need to be dispelled here, this is perhaps the most obvious: that simply because Americans say they do
not “do” empire, there cannot be such a thing as American imperialism. As I write, American troops are engaged in defending governments forcibly called into being by the United States in two distant
countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. They are likely to be there for some
years to come. Even President Bush’s vanquished Democratic rival
John Kerry implied last September that, if he were elected, U.S. forces
would be withdrawn from Iraq within four years—not, in other words,
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the day after his inauguration.6 Iraq, however, is only the front line
of an American imperium, which, like all the great world empires of
history, aspires to much more than just military dominance along a
vast and variegated strategic frontier.7 Empire also means economic,
cultural, and political predominance within (and sometimes also outside) that frontier. On November 6, 2003, in his speech to mark the
20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, President
Bush set out a vision of American foreign policy that, for all its Wilsonian language, strongly implied the kind of universal, civilizing mission that has been a feature of all the great empires:
The United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East… . The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart
of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic
revolution… . The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is
the calling of our country… . We believe that liberty is the design of
nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that
human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom—the freedom we prize—is not for us
alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind.8

He restated this messianic credo in his speech to the Republican
Party convention in September 2004:
The story of America is the story of expanding liberty: an ever-widening circle, constantly growing to reach further and include more. Our
nation’s founding commitment is still our deepest commitment: In our
world, and here at home, we will extend the frontiers of freedom… . We
are working to advance liberty in the broader Middle East because freedom will bring a future of hope and the peace we all want… . Freedom
is on the march. I believe in the transformational power of liberty: The
wisest use of American strength is to advance freedom.9

To the majority of Americans, it would appear, there is no contradiction between the ends of global democratization and the means of
American military power. As defined by their president, the democratizing mission of the United States is both altruistic and distinct
from the ambitions of past empires, which (so it is generally assumed)
aimed to impose their own rule on foreign peoples. The difficulty is
that President Bush’s ideal of “Freedom” as a universal desideratum
rather closely resembles the Victorian ideal of “Civilization.” On close
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inspection, Freedom means the American model of democracy and
capitalism. When Americans speak of “nation building” they actually
mean “state replicating,” in the sense that they want to build political
and economic institutions that are fundamentally similar, though not
necessarily identical, to their own.10 They may not aspire to rule, but
they do aspire to have others rule themselves in the American way. Yet
the very act of imposing freedom simultaneously subverts it. Just as
the Victorians seemed hypocritical when they spread Civilization with
the Maxim gun, so there is something suspect about those who would
democratize Fallujah with the Abrams tank. President Bush’s distinction between conquest and liberation would have been entirely familiar
to the liberal imperialists of the early 1900s, who likewise saw Britain’s
far-flung legions as agents of emancipation (not least in the Middle
East during and after World War I). Equally familiar to that earlier generation would have been the impatience of American officials to hand
over sovereignty to an Iraqi government sooner rather than later. Indirect rule—which installed nominally independent native rulers while
leaving British civilian administrators and military forces in practical
control of financial matters and military security—was the preferred
model for British colonial expansion in many parts of Asia, Africa,
and the Middle East. Iraq itself was an example of indirect rule after
the Hashemite dynasty was established there in the 1920s. The crucial
question today is whether or not the United States has the capabilities,
both material and moral, to make a success of its version of indirect
rule. The danger lies in the inclination of American politicians, eager to
live up to their own emancipatory rhetoric as well as to “bring the boys
back home,” to withdraw from their overseas commitments prematurely—in short, to opt for premature decolonization rather than sustained indirect rule. Unfortunately, history shows that the most violent
time in the life of an empire often comes at the moment of its dissolution, precisely because the withdrawal of imperial troops unleashes a
struggle between rival local elites for control of the indigenous armed
forces.
*****
But is the very concept of empire itself an anachronism? A number of
critics have objected that imperialism was a discreet historical phenomenon that reached its apogee in the late 19th century and has been
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defunct since the 1950s. “The Age of Empire is passed,” declared the
New York Times as L. Paul Bremer III left Baghdad:
The experience of Iraq has demonstrated…that when America does
not disguise its imperial force, when a proconsul leads an ‘occupying
power,’ it is liable to find itself in an untenable position quickly enough.
There are three reasons: the people being governed do not accept such
a form of rule, the rest of the world does not accept it and Americans
themselves do not accept it.11

As one reviewer of Colossus put it, “nationalism is a much more
powerful force now than it was during the heyday of the Victorian
era.”12 According to another, the book failed “to come to terms with
the tectonic changes wrought by independence movements and ethnic
and religious politics in the years since the end of World War II.”13 A
favorite argument of journalists is, perhaps not surprisingly, that the
power of the modern media makes it impossible for empires to operate
as they did in the past, because their misdeeds are so quickly broadcast
to an indignant world.
Such arguments betray a touching naiveté about both the past and
the present. First, empire was no temporary condition of the Victorian
age. Empires, by contrast, can be traced back as far as recorded history
goes. Indeed, most history is in fact the history of empires precisely
because empires are so good at recording, replicating, and transmitting their own words and deeds. It is the nation-state—an essentially
19th-century ideal type—that is the historical novelty and which may
yet prove to be the more ephemeral entity. Given the ethnic heterogeneity and restless mobility of mankind, that is scarcely surprising.
On close inspection, many of the most successful nation-states of the
present started life as empires. What is the modern United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland if not the legatee of an earlier
English imperialism?
Secondly, it is a Rooseveltian fantasy that in 1945 the age of empire
came to an end amid a global springtime of the peoples. On the contrary, the Second World War merely saw the defeat of three would-be
empires—the German, Japanese, and Italian—by an alliance between
the old Western European empires (principally the British, since the
others were so swiftly beaten) and two newer empires, those of the
Soviet Union and the United States. Though the United States for the
most part ran an “empire by invitation” (to the extent that it was more a
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hegemon, in the sense of an alliance leader, than an empire), the Soviet
Union was and remained a true empire until its precipitous decline
and fall. Moreover, the other great Communist power to emerge from
the 1940s, the People’s Republic of China, remains in many respects an
empire to this day. Its three most extensive provinces, Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang and Tibet, were all acquired as a result of Chinese imperial expansion, and China continues to lay claim to Taiwan as well as
numerous smaller islands, to say nothing of some territories in Russian
Siberia and Kazakhstan.
Empires, in short, are always with us. Nor is it immediately obvious why the modern media should reduce the capacity of empires to
sustain themselves. The growth of the popular press did nothing to
weaken the British Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; on
the contrary, the mass-circulation newspapers tended to enhance the
popular legitimacy of the Empire. Anyone who watched how American television networks covered the invasion of Iraq ought to understand that the mass media are not necessarily solvents of imperial
power. As for nationalism, it is something of a myth that this was what
brought down the old empires of Western Europe. Far more lethal to
their longevity were the costs of fighting rival empires, empires that
were still more contemptuous of the principle of self-determination.14
Another common misconception is that the United States can and
should achieve its international objectives—above all, its own security—as a hegemon rather than an empire, “relying on soft power” as
much as on hard power.15 Closely allied to this idea are the assumptions that there will always be less violence in the absence of an empire
than in its presence, and that the United States would therefore make
the world a safer place if it brought its troops home from the Middle
East. One way to test such arguments is to ask the counterfactual question: Would American foreign policy have been more effective in the
past four years—or, if you prefer, would the world be a safer place
today—if Afghanistan and Iraq had not been invaded? In the case of
Afghanistan, there is little question that soft power would not have
sufficed to oust the sponsors of Al-Qaida from their stronghold in
Kabul. In the case of Iraq, it is surely better that Saddam Hussein is the
prisoner of an elected Iraqi government than still reigning in Baghdad.
Open-ended “containment,” which was effectively what the French
government argued for in 2003, would, on balance, have been a worse
policy. Policing Iraq from the air while periodically firing missiles at
suspect installations was costing money without solving the problem
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posed by Saddam. Sanctions may have disarmed Saddam (at the time,
of course, we could not be sure) but they were also depriving ordinary
Iraqis. In any case, the sanctions regime was on the point of collapse
thanks to a systematic campaign by Saddam’s regime to buy votes in
the United Nations Security Council, a campaign of corruption that
was made easy by the United Nations’ Oil for Food program. In short,
the policy of regime change was right; arguably, the principal defect of
American policy toward Iraq was that the task had been left undone
for twelve years. Those who fret about the doctrine of preemption
enunciated in President Bush’s National Security Strategy should bear
in mind that the overthrow of Saddam was as much “post-emption” as
preemption, since Saddam had done nearly all the mischief of which
he was capable some time before March 2003.
Yet it would be absurd to deny that much of what has happened in
the past year—to say nothing of what has been revealed about earlier
events—has tended to undermine the legitimacy of the Bush administration’s policy. To put it bluntly: What went wrong? And has the very
notion of an American empire been discredited?
The first seed of future troubles was the administration’s decision
to treat suspected Al-Qaida personnel captured in Afghanistan and
elsewhere as “unlawful enemy combatants,” beyond the scope of both
American and international law. Prisoners were held incommunicado
and indefinitely at Guantánamo Bay. As the rules governing interrogation were chopped and changed, many of these prisoners were subjected to forms of mental and physical intimidation that in some cases
amounted to torture.16 Indeed, Justice Department memoranda were
written to rationalize the use of torture as a matter for presidential
discretion in time of war. Evidently, some members of the administration felt that extreme measures were justified by the shadowy nature
of the foe they faced, while at the same time being legitimized by the
public appetite for retribution after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. All of this the Supreme Court rightly denounced in its stinging judgment delivered in June 2004. As the Justices put it, not even
the imperatives of resisting “an assault by the forces of tyranny” could
justify the use by an American president of “the tools of tyrants.” Yet
power corrupts, and even small amounts of power can corrupt a very
great deal. It may not have been official policy to flout the Geneva Conventions in Iraq, but not enough was done by senior officers to protect
prisoners held at Abu Ghraib from gratuitous abuse (what the inquiry
chaired by James Schlesinger called “free-lance activities on the part
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of the night shift”).17 The photographic evidence of these “activities”
has done more than anything else to discredit the claim of the United
States and its allies to stand not merely for an abstract liberty but also
for the effective rule of law.
Second, it was more than mere exaggeration on the part of Vice
President Cheney, the former C.I.A. chief George Tenet, and ultimately
President Bush himself—to say nothing of British Prime Minister
Tony Blair—to claim they knew for certain that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. It was, we now know, a downright lie that went far beyond what the available intelligence indicated.
What they could legitimately have said was this: “After all his evasions, we simply can’t be sure whether or not Saddam Hussein has
any WMD. So, on the precautionary principle, we just can’t leave him
in power indefinitely. Better safe than sorry.” But that was not enough
for Cheney, who felt compelled to make the bald assertion that “Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction.” Bush himself
had his doubts, but was reassured by Tenet that it was a “slam-dunk
case.”18 Other doubters soon fell into line. Still more misleading was
the administration’s allegation that Saddam was “teaming up with
al-Qaida.” Sketchy evidence of contacts between the two was used to
insinuate Iraqi complicity in the September 11 attacks, for which not a
shred of proof has been found.
Third, it was a near disaster that responsibility for the postwar occupation of Iraq was seized by the Defense Department, intoxicated as its
principals became in the heat of their blitzkrieg. The State Department
had spent long hours preparing a plan for the aftermath of a successful
invasion. That plan was simply discarded by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his close advisers, who were convinced that once Saddam had
gone, Iraq would magically reconstruct itself (after a period of suitably
ecstatic celebration at the advent of freedom). As one official told the
Financial Times last year, Under-Secretary Douglas Feith led:
a group in the Pentagon who all along felt that this was going to be not
just a cakewalk, it was going to be 60–90 days, a flip-over and hand-off,
a lateral or whatever to…the INC [Iraqi National Congress]. The DoD
[Department of Defense] could then wash its hands of the whole affair
and depart quickly, smoothly and swiftly. And there would be a democratic Iraq that was amenable to our wishes and desires left in its wake.
And that’s all there was to it.19
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When General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, stated in late
February 2003 that “something of the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” would be required to stabilize postwar Iraq, he was
brusquely put down by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz as “wildly off
the mark.” Wolfowitz professed himself “reasonably certain” that the
Iraqi people would “greet us as liberators.” Such illusions were not, it
should be remembered, confined to neoconservatives in the Pentagon.
Even General Tommy Franks was under the impression that it would
be possible to reduce troop levels to just 50,000 after eighteen months.
It was left to Secretary of State Colin Powell to point out to the president that “regime change” had serious—not to say imperial—implications. The Pottery Barn rule, he suggested to Bush, was bound to be
applicable to Iraq: “You break it, you own it.”20
Fourth, American diplomacy in 2003 was like the two-headed Pushmepullyou in Dr. Doolittle, it pointed in opposite directions. On one
side was Cheney, dismissing the United Nations as a negligible factor.
On the other was Powell, insisting that any action would require some
form of U.N. authorization to be legitimate. It is possible that one of
these approaches might have worked. It was, however, hopeless to try
to face both ways. Europe was in fact coming around as a consequence
of some fairly successful diplomatic browbeating. No fewer than eighteen European governments signed letters expressing support for the
impending war against Saddam. Yet the decision to seek a second U.N.
resolution, on the grounds that the language of Resolution 1441 was
not strong enough to justify all-out war, was a blunder that allowed
the French government to regain the initiative by virtue of its permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Despite the fact that more than
forty countries declared their support for the invasion of Iraq and three
(Britain, Australia, and Poland) sent troops, the threat of a French veto,
delivered with a Gallic flourish, created the indelible impression that
the United States was acting unilaterally—and even illegally.21
All of these mistakes had one thing in common: they sprang from
a failure to learn from history. For among the most obvious lessons of
history is that an empire cannot rule by coercion alone. It needs, above
all, legitimacy—in the eyes of the subject people, in the eyes of the
other Great Powers and, most crucially, in the eyes of the people back
home. Did those concerned know no history? We are told that President Bush was reading Edward Morris’s Theodore Rex as the war in Iraq
was being planned. Presumably, he had not reached the part where the
American occupation sparked off a Filipino insurrection. Before the
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invasion of Iraq, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley
was heard to refer to a purely unilateral American invasion as “the
imperial option.” Did no one else grasp that occupying and trying to
transform Iraq (with or without allies) was a quintessentially imperial
undertaking—and one that would not only cost money but would also
take many years to succeed?
*****
Had policymakers troubled to consider what befell the last Anglophone occupation of Iraq, they might have been less surprised by the
persistent resistance in certain parts of the country during 2004. For in
May 1920 there was a major anti-British revolt in Iraq. This happened
six months after a referendum (in practice, a round of consultation with
tribal leaders) on the country’s future, and just after the announcement
that Iraq would become a League of Nations “mandate” under British
trusteeship rather than continue under colonial rule. Strikingly, neither
consultation with Iraqis nor the promise of internationalization sufficed to avert an uprising.
In 1920, as in 2004, the insurrection had religious origins and leaders, but it soon transcended the country’s ancient ethnic and sectarian
divisions. The first anti-British demonstrations were in the mosques
of Baghdad, but the violence quickly spread to the Shiite holy city of
Karbala, where British rule was denounced by Ayatollah Muhammad
Taqi al-Shirazi, the historical counterpart of today’s Shiite firebrand,
Moktada al-Sadr. At its height, the revolt stretched as far north as the
Kurdish city of Kirkuk and as far south as Samawah. Then, as in 2004,
much of the violence was more symbolic than strategically significant;
British bodies were mutilated, much as American bodies were at Fallujah. But there was a real threat to the British position. The rebels systematically sought to disrupt the occupiers’ infrastructure, attacking
railways and telegraph lines. In some places, British troops and civilians were cut off and besieged. By August 1920 the situation in Iraq
was so desperate that the general in charge appealed to London not
only for reinforcements but also for chemical weapons (mustard gas
bombs or shells), though, contrary to historical legend, these turned
out to be unavailable and so were never used.22
This brings us to the second lesson the United States might have
learned from the British experience. Reestablishing order is no easy
task. In 1920 the British eventually ended the rebellion through a com-
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bination of aerial bombardment and punitive village-burning expeditions. Even Winston Churchill, then the minister responsible for the
Royal Air Force, was shocked by the actions of some trigger-happy
pilots and vengeful ground troops. And despite their overwhelming
technological superiority, British forces still suffered more than 2,000
dead and wounded. Moreover, the British had to keep troops in Iraq
long after the country was granted “full sovereignty.” Although Iraq
was declared formally independent in 1932, British troops remained
there until 1955.
Is history repeating itself? For all the talk there was in June 2004 of
restoring “full sovereignty” to an interim Iraqi government, President
Bush made it clear that he intended to “maintain our troop level…as
long as necessary” and that U.S. troops would continue to operate
“under American command.” This in itself implied something significantly less than full sovereignty. If the new Iraqi government did
not have control over a well-armed foreign army in its own territory,
then it lacked one of the defining characteristics of a sovereign state:
a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. That was precisely
the point made in April by Marc Grossman, Under-Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, during Congressional hearings on the future of
Iraq. In Grossman’s words: “The arrangement would be, I think as we
are doing today, that we would do our very best to consult with that
interim government and take their views into account.” But American
commanders would still “have the right, and the power, and the obligation” to decide on the appropriate role for their troops.23
There is, in principle, nothing inherently wrong with “limited sovereignty.” In both West Germany and Japan sovereignty was limited
for some years after 1945. Sovereignty is not an absolute but a relative
concept. Indeed, it is a common characteristic of empires that they
consist of multiple tiers of sovereignty. In what Charles Maier has
called the “fractal geometry of empire,” the superstructure of imperial
power contains within it multiple scaled-down versions of itself, none
fully sovereign. In other words, there are “micro” chains of command
within each link of the “macro” chain of command. Again, however,
there is a need for American policymakers and voters to understand
the imperial business they are now in. For this business can have costly
overheads.
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*****
The problem is that for indirect rule, or limited sovereignty, to be successful in Iraq, Americans must be willing to foot a substantial bill for
the occupation and reconstruction of the country. Unfortunately, in the
absence of a radical change in the direction of U.S. fiscal policy, their
ability to do so is set to diminish, if not to disappear.
Since President Bush’s election, total federal outlays have risen by an
estimated $530 billion, a 30% increase. This increase can be attributed
only partly to the wars the administration has waged. Higher defense
expenditures account for just 30% of the total increment, whereas
increased spending on health care accounts for 17%, Social Security
and income security for 16% apiece, and Medicare for 14%.24 The reality is that the Bush administration has raised expenditure on welfare
by rather more than spending on warfare. Meanwhile, even as expenditure has risen, there has been a steep reduction in the federal government’s revenues, which have slumped from 21% of gross domestic
product in 2000 to less than 16% in 2004.25 The recession of 2001 played
only a minor role in creating this shortfall of receipts. More important
were the three successive tax cuts enacted by the administration with
the support of the Republican-led Congress, beginning with the initial $1.35 trillion tax cut over ten years and the $38 billion tax rebate
of the Economic Growth and Tax Reform Reconciliation Act in 2001,
continuing with the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act in 2002,
and concluding with the reform of the double taxation of dividend
income in 2003. With a combined value of $188 billion—equivalent to
around 2% of the 2003 national income—these tax cuts were significantly larger than those passed in Ronald Reagan’s Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981.26 The effect of this combination of increased spending
and reduced revenue has been a dramatic growth in the federal deficit.
Bush inherited a surplus of around $236 billion from the fiscal year
2000. At the time of writing, the projected deficit for 2004 was $413
billion, representing a swing from the black into the red of nearly twothirds of a trillion dollars.27
Government spokesmen have sometimes defended this borrowing
spree as a stimulus to economic activity. There are good reasons to
be skeptical, however, not least because the principal beneficiaries of
these tax cuts have been the very wealthy. (Vice-President Cheney
belied the macroeconomic argument when he justified the third tax
cut in the following candid terms: “We won the midterms. This is
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our due.”28) Another Cheney aphorism that is bound to be quoted by
future historians is his assertion that “Reagan proved deficits don’t
matter.”29 But Reagan did nothing of the kind. The need to raise taxes
to bring the deficit back under control was one of the key factors in
George H. W. Bush’s defeat in 1992. In turn, the systematic reduction of
the deficit under Bill Clinton was one of the reasons long-term interest
rates declined and the economy boomed in the later 1990s. The only
reason that, under Bush junior, deficits have not seemed to matter is
the persistence of low interest rates over the past four years, which has
allowed Bush, in common with many American households, to borrow
more while paying less in debt service. Net interest payments on the
federal debt amounted to just 1.4% of the GDP last year, whereas the
figure was 2.3% in 2000 and 3.2% in 1995.30
Yet this persistence of low long-term interest rates is not a result of
ingenuity on the part of the U.S. Treasury. It is in part a consequence of
the willingness of the Asian central banks to buy vast quantities of dollar-denominated securities, such as 10-year Treasury bonds, with the
primary motivation of keeping their currencies pegged to the dollar,
and with the secondary consequence of funding the Bush deficits.31 It
is no coincidence that around half the publicly held federal debt is now
in foreign hands, more than double the proportion ten years ago.32 Not
since the days of Czarist Russia has a great empire relied so heavily on
lending from abroad. The trouble is that these flows of foreign capital into the United States cannot be relied on indefinitely, especially
if there is a likelihood of rising deficits in the future. That is why the
Bush administration’s failure to address the fundamental question of
fiscal reform is so important. The reality is that the official figures
for both the deficit and the accumulated federal debt understate the
magnitude of the country’s impending fiscal problems because they
leave out of account the huge and unfunded liabilities of the Medicare
and Social Security systems.33 The United States derives a significant
benefit from the status of the dollar as the world’s principal reserve
currency; it is one reason why foreign investors are prepared to hold
such large volumes of dollar-denominated assets. But reserve-currency
status is not divinely ordained. It could be undermined if international
markets take fright at the magnitude of America’s still latent fiscal
crisis.34 A decline in the dollar would certainly hurt foreign holders
of U.S. currency more than it would hurt Americans. But a shift in
international expectations about U.S. finances might also bring about
a sharp increase in long-term interest rates, which would have imme-
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diate and negative feedback effects on the federal deficit by pushing
up the cost of debt service.35 It would also hurt highly leveraged (or
indebted) American households, especially the rising proportion of
them with adjustable-rate mortgages.36
Empires need not be a burden on the taxpayers of the metropolis;
indeed, many empires have arisen precisely in order to shift tax burdens from the center to the periphery. Yet there is little sign that the
United States will be able to achieve even a modest amount of “burden
sharing” in the foreseeable future. During the Cold War, American
allies contributed at least some money and considerable manpower
to the maintenance of the West’s collective security. But those days
are gone. At the Democratic Party convention in Boston last summer,
John Kerry pledged to “bring our allies to our side and share the burden, reduce the cost to American taxpayers, and reduce the risk to
American soldiers,” in order to “get the job done and bring our troops
home.” “We don’t have to go it alone in the world,” he declared, “and
we need to rebuild our alliances.”37 Yet even if he had won in November, it is far from clear that Kerry would have been able to persuade
the Europeans to commit significant resources to Iraq. In accepting his
party’s nomination, the Massachusetts Senator recalled how, as a boy,
he watched “British, French and American troops” working together
in post-war Berlin. In those days, however, there was a much bigger
incentive—symbolized by the Red Army units that surrounded West
Berlin—for European states to support American foreign policy. It is
not that the French and the Germans (or for that matter the British)
were passionately pro-American during the Cold War. On the contrary, American experts constantly fretted about the levels of popular
anti-Americanism in Europe, on both the Left and the Right. Nevertheless, as long as there was a Soviet Union to the East, there was one
overwhelming argument for the unity of “the West.” That ceased to
be the case fifteen years ago, when the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev
caused the Soviet empire to crumble. Ever since then, the incentives
for transatlantic harmony have grown steadily weaker. Europeans do
not regard the threat posed by Islamist terrorism as sufficiently serious to justify unconditional solidarity with the United States. On the
contrary, since the Spanish general election in March 2004, they have
acted as if the optimal response to the growing threat of Islamist terrorism is to distance themselves from the United States. An astonishingly large number of Europeans see the United States as itself a threat
to international stability. In a recent Gallup poll, 61% of Europeans said
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they thought the European Union plays “a positive role with regard to
peace in the world,” while just 8% said its role was negative. No fewer
than 50% of those polled took the view that the United States now
plays a negative role.38
*****
So the United States is what it would rather not be: a Colossus to some,
a Goliath to others—an empire that dare not speak its name.39 Yet what
is the alternative to American empire? If, as so many people seem to
wish, the United States were to scale back its military commitments
overseas, then what?
We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the
history of world politics, it seems that someone is always the hegemon
or is bidding to play that role. Today, it is the United States; a century
ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and
so on. The great 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke
portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent
conflict. More recent historians have inferred that as the superpowers
of the Cold War era succumb to “overstretch,” their place may be taken
by new powers. Once, the new powers were supposed to be Germany
and Japan. These days, wary realists warn of the ascent of China and
the European Union. Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly;
the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal. The “unipolarity” identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse
cannot last much longer, for the simple reason that history hates a
hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we
must go to a multipolar, multipower world. In other words, if the
United States were to conclude from its experience in Iraq that the time
had come to abandon its imperial pretensions, some other power or
powers would soon seize the opportunity to bid for hegemony.
But what if no successor were to emerge? What if, instead of a balance of power, there was an absence of power? Such a situation is
not unknown in history. Unfortunately, the world’s experience with
power vacuums (or eras of “apolarity,” if you will) is hardly encouraging. Anyone who looks forward eagerly to an American retreat from
hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world
of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon may be the real
alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean not the
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pacifist utopia envisaged in John Lennon’s dirge Imagine, but an anarchic new Dark Age.
Why might a power vacuum arise early in the 21st century? The
reasons are not hard to imagine. Consider the three principal contenders for the succession if the United States were to succumb to imperial
decline. Impressive though the European Union’s recent enlargement
has been (not to mention the achievement of a twelve-country monetary union), the reality is that demographic trends almost certainly
condemn Europe to decline. With fertility rates dropping and life
expectancies rising, Western European societies are projected to have
median ages in the upper 40s by the middle of this century. Indeed,
“Old Europe” will soon be truly old. By 2050, one in every three Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks is expected to be 65 or older, even allowing for ongoing immigration.40 Europeans therefore face an agonizing
choice between Americanizing their economies (i.e., opening their borders to much more immigration, with all the cultural changes that
would entail) or transforming their Union into a kind of fortified
retirement community, in which a dwindling proportion of employees
shoulder the rising cost of outmoded welfare systems. These problems
are compounded by the Euro area’s sluggish growth, a consequence
of labor market rigidities, high marginal tax rates, and relatively low
labor inputs (notably in terms of working hours).41 Meanwhile, the
EU’s still incomplete constitutional reforms mean that individual European nation-states continue to enjoy considerable autonomy outside
the economic sphere, particularly in foreign and security policy.
Optimistic observers of China insist the economic miracle of the past
decade will endure, with growth continuing at such a pace that within
thirty or forty years China’s gross domestic product will surpass that
of the United States.42 Yet it is far from clear that the normal rules for
emerging markets have been suspended for Beijing’s benefit. First, a
fundamental incompatibility exists between the free-market economy,
based inevitably on private property and the rule of law, and the Communist monopoly on power, which breeds corruption and impedes the
creation of transparent fiscal, monetary, and regulatory institutions.
As is common in “Asian Tiger” economies, production is running far
ahead of domestic consumption (thus making the economy heavily
dependent on exports) and even further ahead of domestic financial
development. Indeed, no one knows the full extent of the problems in
the Chinese domestic banking sector.43 Those Western banks that are
buying up bad debts to establish themselves in China need remind-
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ing that this strategy was tried once before, a century ago, in the era
of the Open Door policy, when American and European firms rushed
into China only to see their investments vanish amid the turmoil of
war and revolution. Then, as now, hopes for China’s development ran
euphorically high, especially in the United States. But those hopes
were dashed, and could be disappointed again. A Chinese currency
or banking crisis could have immense ramifications, especially when
Western investors confront the difficulty of repatriating assets held in
China. When foreigners invest directly in factories rather than through
intermediaries such as bond markets, there is no real need for capital
controls. It is no easy thing to repatriate a steel mill.
With birthrates in Muslim societies more than double the European
average, the Islamic countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East
are bound to put some kind of pressure on Europe and the United
States in the years ahead. If, for example, the population of Yemen
could exceed that of Germany by 2050 (as the United Nations forecasts), there must either be a dramatic improvement in the Middle
East’s economic performance or substantial emigration from the Arab
world to aging Europe. Yet the subtle Muslim colonization of Europe’s
cities—most striking in France, where North Africans populate whole
suburbs of cities like Marseille and Paris—may not necessarily portend
the advent of a new and menacing “Eurabia.”44 In fact, the Muslim
world is as divided as ever, and not merely along the traditional fissure between Sunnis and Shiites. It is also split between those Muslims
seeking a peaceful modus vivendi with the West (an impulse embodied
in the Turkish government’s desire to join the EU) and those drawn to
the revolutionary Islamism of renegades like Osama bin Laden. Opinion polls from Morocco to Pakistan suggest high levels of anti-American sentiment, but not unanimity. In Europe, only a minority expresses
overt sympathy for terrorist organizations. Most young Muslims in
England still seem to prefer assimilation to jihad. We are still a long
way from a bipolar clash of civilizations, much less the rise of a new
caliphate that might pose a geopolitical threat to the United States and
its allies.
In short, two of the obvious potential successors to the United States,
the European Union and China, seem to contain within them the seeds
of future decline; while Islam remains a diffuse force in world politics,
lacking the resources of a superpower.
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*****
Let us now imagine that American neoconservative hubris meets its
nemesis in Iraq and that the Bush administration’s project to democratize the Middle East at gunpoint ends in ignominious withdrawal.
Suppose also that no aspiring rival power steps in to fill the resulting
vacuums—not only in Iraq but conceivably also in Afghanistan, the
Balkans, and Haiti. What would an apolar future look like? The answer
is not easy, as there have been very few periods in world history with
no contenders for the role of global, or at least regional, hegemon. The
nearest approximation in modern times might be the 1920s, when the
United States walked away from President Woodrow Wilson’s project
of global democracy, and collective security centered on the League of
Nations. There was certainly a power vacuum in Central and Eastern
Europe after the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern,
and Ottoman empires, but it did not last long. The old West European
empires were quick to snap up the choice leftovers of Ottoman rule in
the Middle East. The Bolsheviks had reassembled the czarist empire by
1922. And by 1936 German revanche was already well advanced.
One must go back much further in history to find a period of true
and enduring apolarity; as far back, in fact, as the 9th and 10th centuries. In this era, the two sundered halves of the Roman Empire—Rome
and Byzantium—had long passed the height of their power. The leadership of the Western half was divided between the pope, who led
Christendom, and the heirs of Charlemagne, who split up his shortlived empire under the Treaty of Verdun in 843. No credible claimant
to the title of emperor emerged until Otto was crowned in 962, and
even he was merely a German prince with pretensions (never realized)
to rule Italy. Byzantium, meanwhile, was grappling with the Bulgar
rebellion to the north, while the Abbasid caliphate, initially established
by Abu al-Abbas in 750, was in steep decline by the middle of the 10th
century. In China, too, imperial power was in a dip between the T’ang
and Sung dynasties.
The weakness of the older empires allowed new and smaller entities to flourish. When the Khazar tribe converted to Judaism in 740,
their khanate occupied a Eurasian power vacuum between the Black
Sea and the Caspian Sea. In Kiev, far from the reach of Byzantium,
the regent Olga laid the foundation for the future Russian Empire in
957 when she embraced the Orthodox Church. The Seljuks, forebears
of the Ottoman Turks, carved out the Sultanate of Rum as the Abba-
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sid caliphate lost its grip over Asia Minor. Africa had its mini-empire
in Ghana; Central America had its Mayan civilization. Connections
between all these entities were minimal or nonexistent. This condition
was the antithesis of globalization. The world was broken up into disconnected, introverted civilizations.
One distinctive feature of the era was that, in the absence of strong
secular polities, religious questions often produced serious convulsions. Indeed, it was religious institutions that often set the political
agenda. In the 8th and 9th centuries, Byzantium was racked by controversy over the proper role of icons in worship. By the 11th century, the Pope felt confident enough to humble Holy Roman Emperor
Henry IV during the battle over which of them should have the right
to appoint bishops. The new monastic orders amassed considerable
power in Christendom, particularly the Cluniacs, the first order to
centralize monastic authority. In the Muslim world, it was the ulema
(clerics) who truly ruled. This ascendancy of the clergy helps to explain
why the period ended with the extraordinary holy wars known as the
Crusades, the first of which was launched by European Christians in
1095. Yet this apparent clash of civilizations was in many ways just
another example of the apolar world’s susceptibility to long-distance
military raids directed at urban centers by more backward peoples.
The Vikings repeatedly attacked West European towns in the 9th century, including Nantes in 842 and Seville in 844, to name just two. One
Frankish chronicler bemoaned “the endless flood of Vikings” sweeping southward. Byzantium, too, was sacked in 860 by raiders from Rus,
the kernel of the future Russia. This “fierce and savage tribe” showed
“no mercy,” lamented the Byzantine patriarch. It was like “the roaring
sea…destroying everything, sparing nothing.” Such were the conditions of an anarchic age. Small wonder that the future seemed to lie in
creating small, defensible political units like the Venetian republic (the
quintessential city-state, which was conducting its own foreign policy
by 840) or Alfred the Great’s England (arguably the first thing resembling a nation-state in European history, created in 886).
Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the
age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling
differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world’s established powers retreating into their own regional spheres of influence. But what
of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies
created under U.S. leadership after the Second World War? The United
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the
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World Trade Organization all consider themselves in some way representative of the “international community.” Surely their aspirations to
global governance point to the true alternative to American empire: a
new “Light Age” of collective security and international law, the very
antithesis of the Dark Ages?45 Yet universal claims were also an integral
part of the rhetoric of that distant era. All the empires maintained that
they ruled the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, may have even believed that they did. The reality, however, was
not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven, but
political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational
institutions, but downward.
With the end of the state’s monopoly on the means of violence and
the collapse of its control over channels of communication, humanity
has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as integration. If free flows of information and of the means of production
empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the
free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever
they choose, from New York to Najaf, from Madrid to Moscow. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is,
in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic outposts such as Kabul
and Pristina. In short, it is the non-state actors who truly wield global
power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time.
Waning empires, religious revivals, incipient anarchy, a retreat into
fortified cities—these are the Dark Age experiences that a post-imperial world could find itself reliving. The symptoms are already not
far to seek. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be
altogether more dangerous than the Dark Age of the 9th and 10th
centuries. The world is much more populous, roughly twenty times
more. Technology has transformed production. Now human societies
depend not merely on fresh water and the harvest but also on finite
supplies of fossil fuels that pollute the earth’s atmosphere, altering its
climate even as they are used. Technology has upgraded destruction,
too. It is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For all
these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should perturb us today
a great deal more than it perturbed the heirs of Charlemagne. If the
United States is to retreat from global hegemony—its fragile self-image
dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home
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and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of
multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power.
For the alternative to unipolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It
could be apolarity, a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous
forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new
world disorder.
*****
The best case for empire is always the case for order. Liberty is, of
course, a loftier goal. But only those who have never known disorder
fail to grasp that order is the necessary precondition for liberty. In that
sense, the case for American empire is simultaneously a case against
international anarchy. None of this is to pretend that the United States
is a perfect empire. Empires are by their very nature compromised by
the power that they wield; they inexorably engender their own dissolution at home even as they impose order abroad. That is why our
expectations should not be pitched too high. If it is hard enough to be
an empire when you believe you have a mandate from heaven, how
much harder is it for the United States, which believes that heaven
intended it to free the world, not rule it! Sadly, there are still a few
places in the world that must be ruled before they can be freed. Sadly,
the act of ruling them will sorely try Americans, who instinctively
begrudge such places the blood, treasure, and time that they consume.
Yet, saddest of all, there seems to be no better alternative for the United
States and the world. Once, a hundred and sixty years ago, America’s
imperial destiny seemed manifest. It has since become obscure. But it
is America’s destiny just the same. 
•
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